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This paper analyzes the impact of informal care by adult children on the use of long-term care 
among the elderly in Europe and the effect of the level of the parent’s disability on this 
relationship. We focus on two types of formal home care that are the most likely to interact 
with informal care: paid domestic help and nursing care. Using the most recent European data 
emerging from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we build a 
two-part utilization model analyzing both the decision to use each type of formal care or not 
and the amount of formal care received by the elderly. Instrumental variables estimations are 
used to control for the potential endogeneity existing between formal and informal care. We 
find endogeneity of informal care in the decision to receive paid domestic help. Estimation 
results indicate that informal care substitutes for this type of formal home care. However, we 
find that this substitution effect tends to disappear as the level of disability of the elderly 
person increases. Finally, informal care is a weak complement to nursing care, independently 
of the level of disability. These results highlight the heterogeneous effects of informal care on 
formal care use and suggest that informal care is an effective substitute for long-term care as 
long as the needs of the elderly are low and require unskilled type of care. Any policy 
encouraging informal care to decrease long-term care expenditures should take it into account 
to assess its effectiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Population ageing in most developed countries will undoubtedly have important effects on 
the demand for long-term care.
4 The growing proportion of elderly is likely to increase 
substantially long-term care demand (Yang et al., 2003; Pezzin et al., 1996). As a percentage 
of GDP, projected long-term care expenditure would increase by 168% in Germany, 149% in 
Spain, 138% in Italy between 2000 and 2050 (Comas-Herrera et al., 2003). To cope with this 
issue, it is necessary to find a way to limit the burden imposed by this process. Historically, 
family has always been the major source of care for dependent individuals. One suggested 
solution to slow down the expected increase in long-term care expenditure is to encourage the 
development of informal care provided by the family to their frail elderly. Briefly, informal 
care means unpaid, non-organised assistance given to an ill or disabled person offered within 
the social network while formal care is professionally organised paid help (Portrait and al., 
2000). Indeed, it is thought that informal care is less costly than formal care arrangements. 
Moreover, the elderly sometimes prefers this alternative. However, this solution is likely to 
lessen long-term care expenditure only if informal care is an effective substitute for formal 
care.  
The aim of this paper is to assess the effects of informal care provided by the adult 
children to their elderly parents on the demand for formal home care in Europe. For this 
purpose, we use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
to estimate a model of formal care demand for the elderly. We focus on two types of formal 
home care that are the most likely to interact with informal care: paid domestic help and 
nursing care. Paid domestic help consists in professional help in doing tasks such as doing 
work around the house or the garden or shopping for groceries. Nursing care mainly consists 
in personal care provided by professionals in order to help the dependent individual to 
perform basic tasks such as dressing, bathing or using the toilet. Moreover, we analyse 
whether the relationship between formal and informal care differs according to the disability 
level of the elderly. To our knowledge, this particular issue has not yet been analysed in the 
literature. If the effect of informal care is heterogeneous according to the disability level, this 
may have important implications regarding the effectiveness of policies encouraging informal 
care in order to decrease the long-term care expenditures. More particularly, if informal care 
only substitutes for formal care use among individuals with low disability, any policy 
encouraging informal care is likely to have limited effects on long term care expenditures.  
Several studies have analysed the relationship between formal and informal care but no 
clear results emerge regarding the substitutability of these two types of help. Ettner (1994) 
shows that Medicaid home care subsidies have increased the use of formal care and reduced 
informal care among the no institutionalised persons regarding no medical care. Pezzin and 
Schone (1999) find a substitution relationship between paid home care when analysing the 
informal care given by adult daughters to their elderly parents. On the contrary, Langa and al. 
(2001) find a rather complementary relationship: the increase in home health care that took 
place during the 1990s in the United States has mostly benefited individuals with a relatively 
high social support. Moreover, Christianson (1988) shows that the increase in formal care due 
to the Channeling, which consists in a National Long Term Care Demonstration that took 
place during the 1980’s in US, has virtually no effect on the supply of informal care. Pezzin 
and al. (1996) also find a limited substitution between publicly provided home care and 
informal care. Instead of relieving informal caregivers, they can result in more help given to 
elderly. Van Houtven and Norton (2004) obtain different results depending on the type of care 
granted. They find a net substitution for all types of care except for outpatient surgery. This 
                                                 
4 Long-term care is defined as a range of services for persons who are dependent on help with basic activities of 
daily living.   3
high variability in the results is partly due to the endogeneity existing between formal and 
informal care. The most recent studies (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004, 2007; Pezzin and 
Schone, 1999; Charles and Sevak, 2005; Bolin et al, 2007) take into account this endogeneity 
bias. It is worth noting that these studies usually find that the two types of help are substitute. 
Bolin et al (2007) have also analysed the effect of informal care on the use of different types 
of formal and medical care in Europe using SHARE data. They find that informal care 
substitutes for formal home care while it is a complement to doctor and hospital visit. In the 
present study, we focus on the use formal home care and analyses separately nursing care and 
paid domestic help while Bolin et al (2007) consider home care as a whole without 
distinguishing the two types of care. We show that it is important to distinguish the type of 
home care as informal care has different effect with respect to the home care considered. 
Moreover, we highlight the heterogeneity in the effect of informal care on formal care use 
with respect to the level of disability of the elderly.  
Before going further into the analysis, it is first interesting to roughly compare the use of 
formal and informal care among the elderly across European countries. Northern European 
countries mainly rely on the State in the provision of care to the elderly while family is the 
main source of care for the elderly in Southern Europe. Figure 1 sketches a preliminary result 
from the SHARE-data by analysing the relationship between the provision of informal care by 
the adult children on the demand for paid domestic help and nursing care by the elderly (65 
year-old or over) across nine European countries.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Paid domestic help to the elderly appears less used in countries where informal care from 
the adult children is more intensively provided. However, no clear relationship between 
nursing care and informal care emerges from this cross-country comparison. These 
preliminary results suggest that informal care is an effective substitute for paid domestic help 
while it is not related to the use of nursing care. However, a more detailed analysis at the 
micro-level is required in order to assess the robustness of these preliminary results.  
The empirical analysis of the effect informal care on formal care use by older individuals 
raises several issues. First, the decision to provide informal care to parents and the decision to 
use formal care are simultaneously determined. Moreover, spurious positive correlation may 
exist between formal and informal care because unobserved negative health characteristics 
(Charles and Sevak, 2005), or unobserved preferences for care are likely to increase the 
demand for both formal and informal care. As a result, the model will use instrumental 
variables for informal care that are related to the provision of informal care and can plausibly 
be assumed not to be correlated to the error term of the formal care use equation. We argue 
that the geographical distance of the nearest child and the number of sons and daughters fulfil 
the conditions for being valid instruments for informal care. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the 
conceptual framework and highlights the main issues raised in analysing relationship between 
the demand for formal and informal care. Section 3 explains the empirical model and 
discusses the econometric issues. Section 4 provides a description of the SHARE data and the 
variables used in the empirical model. Section 5 presents the estimation results and Section 6 
checks those results by performing some sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Formal versus informal care 
 
Theoretical models related to the utilisation of formal and informal care among the elderly 
are mainly based on the family-decision making process and a health production function   4
(Grossman, 1972; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004) or an ability for the elderly to perform 
activities of daily living function (Stabile et al, 2006) using as inputs formal and informal 
care. According to those models, the relationship between informal and formal care depends 
then on the sign of the derivative of the marginal product of formal care (in the production of 
health) with respect to informal care, which means that complementarity or substitution 
between formal and informal care is essentially an empirical issue (Bolin et al., 2007). In this 
paper, we test whether the relationship between formal and informal care differs according to 
the disability level of the elderly. Conceptually, it consists in analysing whether disability 
level has an effect on the derivative of the marginal product of formal care with respect to 
informal care in the production of health or the ability to perform activities of daily living. 
The empirical relationship between formal and informal care is not straightforward. As 
mentioned previously, prior studies on this topic provide mitigated results regarding the 
nature and the sign of the link between these two types of care. This inconsistency highlights 
the complexity of the mechanisms lying behind the relationship between formal and informal 
care. Several aspects are important to take into account in order to analyse the provision of 
formal and informal care.  
First, endogeneity of informal care in a model explaining formal care use is likely to be 
present for at least two reasons: the decision to provide informal care to parents and the 
decision to use formal care are simultaneously determined (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). 
Moreover, spurious positive correlation may exist between formal and informal care. It may 
be due to unobserved negative health characteristics that are likely to increase the demand for 
both formal and informal care (Charles and Sevak, 2005) or to unobserved preferences for 
care affecting both formal and informal care use.  
Second, the relationship between formal and informal care is likely to differ according to 
the type of formal care used (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Bolin et al, 2007). In practice, 
care encompasses a great number of services ranging from personal care to gardening or 
shopping. While it is difficult to distinguish the type of informal care due to its 
multidimensional nature, formal care providers can specialise in certain aspects of care and 
the type of care provided can be better identified. Informal care is likely to be substitute for 
formal care that requires low skills such as shopping for grocery or cleaning the house. 
However, this substitution effect may not apply to formal care demanding higher skills such 
as personal care: children are less likely to be able to perform such tasks or the parent may be 
reluctant that their children help them for dressing, bathing or going to the toilet. As a result, 
we expect that the substitution effect between informal care and formal care is larger for paid 
domestic help (a low skilled care) than for nursing care. 
Finally, the disability level of the elderly may change the link between these two types of 
care: informal care is likely to be a substitute for elderly with low disability while it may 
become complementary for the highly handicapped individuals. When the dependency is low, 
informal care is likely to substitute for formal care as the type of help required demands low 
skills and few commitments. However, as the disability level increases, the burden imposed 
by care becomes so heavy that it requires both formal and informal care. At this stage, the 
relationship between formal and informal care is likely to become complementary, the 
informal carer acting as the agent of the dependent elderly to improve the formal care 
services. The informal carer is likely to be better informed about the needs of the dependent 
and the formal care services than the dependent herself, especially in case of mental health 
disease.  
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3. Empirical model 
 
The empirical model consists in analysing the causal effect of informal care from the 
children to their elderly parents on the demand for formal care. The analysis addresses the 
following issues: endogeneity, differential effects by types of formal care and by disability 
level. While the first two issues have been analysed in the literature (Van Houtven and 
Norton, 2004; Bolin et al., 2007), this paper is the first to analyse the relationship between 
formal and informal care according to the disability level of the elderly.  
Our model focuses on two types of formal home care: nursing care and paid domestic 
help. The distributions of these two variables are characterised by high proportions of zeros. 
In principle, a tobit model can be used to take this particularity into account. However, the 
tobit model assumes that the effects of the explanatory variables on the probability to receive 
the « treatment » and the quantity used once the « treatment » is received have the same 
direction. This may not be the case. In order to check for this possibility, we use a two-part 
model introduced by Duan et al. (1983) that allows to separate behaviour into two stages, first 
a decision about receiving the treatment and then, a decision about the level of this treatment 
conditional on receiving any. The parent’s utilisation of formal care (gij) is a function of 
informal care (hi), the disability level (Di) and a vector of socio-demographic characteristics 
(Xi). The subscript i represents the individual and the j =1, 2 the two types of formal care 
analysed in this paper. The two-part model assumes that part one, ) 0 ( > ij g P , is described by a 
binary probit model such that: 
 
  )) , ( ) 1 ln( ( ) , , | 0 ( 1 Dj i i hj j X i j i i i ij D f h X D h X g P γ γ γ γ + + + + Φ = > ,     (1) 
 
where  (.) Φ  represents the cumulative density function of the standard normal,  f(.) is a 
polynomial in disability (Di) allowing non-linear disability effect on the demand for formal 
care (our model uses the quadratic function) and j 1 γ , Xj γ , hj γ , and Dj γ are parameters to be 
estimated. Part two corresponds to the following equation assuming that the logarithm of the 
positive values of gij is linear in Xi, ln(1+hi), and  f(Di, . ): 
 
) , ( ) 1 ln( ] , , , 0 | ) [ln( 1 j D i i j h j X i j i i i ij ij D f h X D h X g g E β β β β + + + + = > ,     (2) 
 
where j 1 β , Xj β , hj β , and Dj β are parameters to be estimated by OLS. 
As mentioned before, we suspect that the main variable of interest, informal care (hi), is 
endogenous because of the possible simultaneity between formal and informal care and 
unobserved characteristics that lead to spurious correlation between the two variables of 
interest. As a result, we have to control for the endogeneity in the model in order to get 
unbiased estimates of the effect of informal care on the demand for formal care. Regarding 
the part one of the two-part model, the standard approach of instrumental variables estimation 
used in linear model provides inconsistent estimates when applied to nonlinear model. 
Instead, Rivers and Vuong (1988) propose a two-step approach to get consistent estimates for 
the probit model in presence of endogeneity. This method consists in including the residuals 
of the first stage equation in the second stage equation. It is worth noting that the resulting 
coefficients are estimated only up to scale. However, their sign and significance are of 
interest. Furthermore, we can consistently estimate the average partial effect and thus the 
elasticity of formal care with respect to informal care by adjusting the scaled coefficients 
appropriately (Wooldridge, 2002, p.474).
 5 Part one of the two-part model is estimated by 
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using Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares (Newey, 1987).
6  Part two uses the standard two-
stage least squares estimation. 
The instrumental variables have to be correlated with the provision of informal care but 
not with the error terms of the formal care utilisation equation. The choice of such variables is 
driven by the potential effect that they can have on the supply of informal care by the 
children. Geographical distance from children is a possible candidate as it might represent a 
substantial cost of caring for the informal caregiver. Several studies have shown the 
importance of this variable for the provision of informal care (Charles and Sevak, 2005; Stern, 
1995). Children living further away from their parents are less likely to provide informal care 
than closer children. This variable thus fulfils the first condition to be a valid instrument for 
informal care. However, the second condition, requiring no correlation between the error 
terms of the formal care equation and the instrumental variable, is not necessarily satisfied. 
Parents may choose to move nearer to their children when their health deteriorates, or 
children may choose to live near their disabled parents. If the model does not fully take into 
account the effects of health on the use of formal care, the error terms are likely to be 
negatively correlated to the distance to the nearest child. However, Charles and Sevak (2005) 
find no evidence that children are more likely to live close by when their parent is in bad 
health. Bolin et al (2007) use a dummy indicating whether the elderly has children living less 
than 100 kilometers away as an instrument using SHARE data and their instruments passes 
the overidentification restriction test. Moreover, Stern (1995) shows that, although it is 
endogenous to the supply of informal care from the children, distance is a strong predictor of 
informal care supply and the related endogeneity bias is very limited. A sensitivity analysis in 
Section 6.1 will test the effect of excluding distance from the set of instruments. Other 
components having potential impacts on the supply of informal care are the number of 
children and their gender. Numerous studies show that daughters provide more care to their 
parents than sons (see, for example, Horowitz, 1985). A test of overidentifying restriction will 
assess the validity of our set of instruments for each of the model considered in this paper. It 
is worth noting that we tried other instruments for informal care: the number of grandchildren, 
the age of the children, and their education level. All these instruments have only a poor 
predictive power regarding the supply of informal care and are not used in our analysis. 
The dependent variable of the informal care equation is the logarithm of the average 
number of hours of informal care received per month by the children. A unit was added to the 
natural hours of care before the log transformation to avoid the problem of zero hours (Pezzin 
et al., 1996). This gives: 
 
C i D i X i i i i i C D f X C D X h E δ δ δ δ + + + = + ) , ( ] , , | ) 1 [ln( 1 ,       ( 3 )  
 
where Ci is a vector of the children characteristics mentioned above and 1 δ , X δ , h δ  and D δ  are 
parameters to be estimated by OLS. 
The model is first estimated ignoring the possibility that the coefficient on informal care 
may differ according to the disability degree of the elderly. In a second step, this assumption 
is relaxed allowing informal care to have different effects on formal care according to the 
disability degree of the dependent individual. The two-part model can now be described by 
the following equations: 
 
)) 1 ln( ' ) ' , ( ) 1 ln( ' ' ' ( ) , , | 0 ( 1 i i Dhj Dj i i j h j X i j i i i ij h D D f h X D h X g P + + + + + + Φ = > γ γ γ γ γ ,   (4) 
) 1 ln( ' ) ' , ( ) 1 ln( ' ' ' ] , , , 0 | ) [ln( 1 i i Dhj j D i i j h j X i j i i i ij ij h D D f h X D h X g g E + + + + + + = > β β β β β . (5) 
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This implies that the model to be estimated has now one more endogenous variable. This 
new feature requires new instruments in order to identify the effect of the interaction term on 
the demand for formal care. The candidate for such an instrument is the product of the 
disability degree and the distance from the nearest child. The first-stage equations of the IV 
model are described as follows: 
 
DC i i C i D i X i i i i i C D C D f X C D X h E ' ' ) ' , ( ' ' ] , , | ) 1 [ln( 1 δ δ δ δ δ + + + + = + ,     (6) 




SHARE is a European multi-disciplinary survey including more than 30,000 persons aged 
50 and over, and coming from 11 European countries ranging from Scandinavia to the 
Mediterranean, and Israel.
7 We use in this paper the release 2 of the first wave of the survey, 
which was conducted in 2004. The survey brings together many disciplines, including 
demography, economics, epidemiology, psychology and sociology. The data were collected 
using a computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) program, supplemented by a self-
completion paper and pencil questionnaire. For more details on the sampling procedure, 
questionnaire contents and fieldwork methodology, readers must refer to Börsch-Supan et al. 
(2005).  
 
4.1. Sample selection criteria 
 
To be selected in our analysis, respondents have to be at least 65 year-old, to have 
between one and four children
8 and not to live with one of their children or in institution. We 
exclude individuals living with their children because it is difficult to distinguish the way, the 
type and the importance of the transfers that take place within a household. Moreover, the 
analysis focuses on the formal care in the community because the sampling design of the first 
wave of SHARE does not include institutionalised individuals. This may potentially affect our 
results if the decision to institutionalise an older individual represents a substantial 
substitution of formal care for informal care (Pezzin et al., 1996). Moreover, we discard 
observations with missing or unreliable values for the variables of interest and the other 
explanatory variables. Finally, we do not use data from Greece, Israel and Switzerland 
because we do not have the information about formal care use in these countries. Our final 
sample includes 7,329 observations for nine European countries. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of the main variables used in the model. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
4.2. Dependent variables: the use of formal care 
 
This paper analyses the demand for two types of formal care: paid domestic help and 
nursing care. As a high number of respondents do not use these types of formal care at all, we 
create two dummies equal to one when the corresponding formal care has been used during 
the twelve months preceding the survey and zero otherwise. Regarding the quantity, the 
respondents are asked to report the number of weeks and the average number of hours per 
                                                 
7 The first wave of SHARE data includes twelve countries: Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), 
Denmark (DK), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland 
(CH) and Israel (IL).  
8 Parents with more than four children account only for a small fraction of the population.   8
week they received the corresponding formal care (paid domestic help or nursing care) during 
the twelve months preceding the survey. Our dependent variables are the product of these two 
measures divided by 12 to get the average number of hours per month.  
 
4.3. Informal care and the instrumental variables 
 
The informal care measure used in this paper is the average total number of hours of 
informal care received from the children of the respondent per month.
9 This variable is based 
on three questions that ask the respondent to give the relationship with the caregiver (if any), 
the frequency (daily, weekly, monthly or less often) of informal care received and the average 
number of hours per day/week/month/year respectively. We transform these variables into a 
measure of the average total number of hours of informal care received from the children per 
month. 
Informal care given by the children is assumed to depend on several children 
characteristics that are independent of the demand for formal care. As discussed in the 
previous section we assume that geographical proximity and the gender of the children mainly 
explain the supply of informal care to the parents. The gender composition of the children is 
represented by the number of sons and daughters of the respondent. Geographical proximity 
corresponds to the distance of the nearest child from the elderly parent. In SHARE, this 
variable is allowed to take the following categories: the children can live either in the same 
building (but not the same household), less than 1 kilometre away, between 1 and 5 
kilometres away, between 5 and 25 kilometres away, between 25 and 100 kilometres away, 
between 100 and 500 kilometres away or more than 500 kilometres away. From this variable, 
we compute a new variable, the distance from the nearest child, by assigning the number of 
kilometres corresponding to the middle of the bandwidth of each possible categorical answer.  
 
4.4. Parent’s explanatory variables 
 
The demand for formal care is assumed to depend on various parent’s characteristics. 
First, our empirical model includes several socio-demographic variables: gender, age, years of 
education, household composition (whether the parent lives alone or not) and home 
ownership. Moreover, the model also includes dummies related to the country-specific net-
worth quartile (including housing wealth) and gross household income quartile of the 
respondent to take into account the ability to pay of the elderly.
10 Finally, we construct a 
health-related index representing the disability level of the elderly in order to have only one 
variable related to health in the model. This allows us to analyse more easily the interaction of 
informal care and the disability level on the demand for formal care
11. This index is 
constructed on the basis of a categorical variable from the SHARE questionnaire that asks to 
which extent, if any, the respondent is limited in his daily activities because of health-related 
problem, and numerous objective variables on the health status of the individual that are 
available in SHARE. These variables include a set of dummies related to the chronic diseases, 
the symptoms, the limitations with the Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and the Instrumental 
Activities of Daily Living (IADL), and the mobility limitations of the respondent.
12 In order 
                                                 
9 In SHARE, the information about the amount of informal care received is collected for only up to three 
potential informal caregivers. So, if the respondent has more than three caregivers, it is possible that our variable 
of informal care underestimates the amount of informal care provided by all the children. 
10 Household income is only available in gross amount in the wave 1 of SHARE. 
11 The model has also been estimated using all the health-related variables separately in the model that does not 
take into account the cross effects of informal care and the disability level on the demand for formal care but the 
results are not significantly affected by this modification. 
12 See the Appendix 2 for more details about the variables used.   9
to get a synthetic index of the disability level of the respondent, we perform an ordered probit 
model with the limitation question as dependent variable and the set of dummies as 
explanatory variables.
 13 Most of the variables have expected sign and are significantly 
different from zero. From these results, we compute the latent index and define it as the 
disability level of the respondent. This variable has the advantage to take into account many 
aspects of the health of the respondent. Section 6 also estimates the model using alternative 
specifications of the disability level of the elderly. 
 
 5. Estimation results 
 
In this section, we present the estimation results for our model. We show both the 
estimation of the two-part model considering the provision of informal care as exogenous and 
the same model taking into account the possible endogeneity of this variable on the demand 
for formal care. Moreover, we distinguish two types of formal home care: nursing care and 
paid domestic help. All equations include country-dummies to take into account the cross-
country heterogeneity regarding the provision of formal and informal care.
14 
 
5.1. Informal care supply equation 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the informal care equation. The model has an 
adjusted-R² of 15.7%. The variable corresponding to the number of daughters has a 
significant positive impact on the provision of informal care to older parents. The distance to 
the nearest child and its square are highly significant regarding the hours of informal care 
received. The further the children are, the lower the provision of informal care. The F-test of 
the excluded instruments suggested by Bound et al. (1995) confirms that they are significant 
predictors of informal care supply (F (4, 7303) = 28.18). 
It is worth noting that informal care depends on several other variables included in the 
model. First, informal care provision is higher among older individuals and those with low 
education level. Moreover, individuals living alone are more likely to receive informal care. 
Wealthier parents receive less informal care while homeowners receive more. Finally, results 
indicate that the disability level of the elderly significantly increases the supply of informal 
care. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
5.2. Paid domestic help demand equation 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the two-part model for the use of paid domestic 
help. Looking at the model assuming exogeneity of children’s informal care, the estimated 
coefficients on the logarithm of total hours of informal care are positive and significant for 
both the choice and the intensity equation. However, the null hypothesis of the Wald test of 
exogeneity of informal care is significantly rejected in the instrumental variable (IV) probit 
equation ( 16 . 12
2
1 = χ ) indicating that informal care is endogenous to the decision to use paid 
domestic help. As a result, the coefficient estimates from the simple probit equation are 
inconsistent. The model passes the overidentification restriction test ( 25 . 3
2
3 = χ ) indicating that 
the selected instruments are independent from the error terms of the structural equation. The 
IV probit equation reveals a negative and highly significant relationship between the decision 
                                                 
13 The results from the ordered probit model are available in Appendix 2. 
14 Results for these country-dummies are not presented in the Tables but are available in Appendix 3.   10
to get paid domestic help and informal care. This confirms our expectations that informal care 
is a substitute for paid domestic help. Regarding the intensity equation of paid domestic help, 
the null hypothesis of the Wu-Hausman test is not rejected (F(1, 611) = 0.31) indicating that 
the exogeneity of informal care on the intensity of paid domestic help cannot be rejected. 
However, as endogeneity as been detected in part one of the demand for paid domestic help 
model, we focus on the results assuming endogeneity even if the data failed to reject the 
hypothesis of exogenity for the intensity equation. The effect of informal care on the number 
of hours of paid domestic help is positive and significant at the 10-percent level. Informal care 
is a substitute in the choice of the use of paid domestic help but is a complement in the 
intensity of it. From these results, we compute the elasticity of paid domestic use with respect 
to informal care for the average individual taking into account that the parameters of the IV 
probit are only estimated up to scale
15. A 10-percent increase of informal care leads to a 
decrease by 7-percent of the use of paid domestic help (See Table 6).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
It is worth noting several other results obtained from this analysis. Regarding the 
individual characteristics, elderly women are more likely to use paid domestic help than men. 
Age is also a factor that increases the need for more paid domestic help. Education plays no 
role in the decision to pay for such care but has a significant positive impact regarding the 
quantity of domestic help conditional on having any. The coefficients on income quartiles 
indicate a positive and significant relationship between income and paid domestic help. The 
disability level is as expected an important factor of formal domestic help decision among 
elderly in Europe. Moreover, elderly parents living alone are much more likely to use this 
kind of formal care. This could come from a potential substitution effect of informal care 
from other individuals (mainly the spouse) living in the same household. 
 
5.3. Nursing care demand equation 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the two-part model of nursing care use. Regarding the 
decision to receive such care, the Wald test does not reject the exogeneity of informal care on 
the dependent variable ( 20 . 0
2
1 = χ ). Moreover, the null hypothesis of the Wu-Hausman test of 
exogeneity of informal care on the intensity of nursing care is not rejected (F(1,424) = 0.35). 
As a result, the simple two-part model is preferred to the model assuming endogeneity of 
informal care on nursing care. The simple two-part model exhibits a positive and significant 
relationship between informal care and the decision to receive nursing care but it is not 
significant regarding the quantity of nursing care received conditional on receiving any. This 
means that informal care from the children is complementary to the demand of nursing care in 
the decision to resort to such care. However, the computed elasticity of the average individual 
is low: a 10-percent increase of informal care leads to an increase by 2-percent of nursing care 
use (See Table 6). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Age and living alone have a positive effect on the probability to receive nursing care. 
Moreover, the disability level appears as having a significant positive effect on both the 
decision and the quantity of nursing care. 
 
                                                 
15 See Appendix 1 for more details about the computation of the elasticities.   11
5.4. The relationship between informal care and formal care demand according to the 
disability level 
 
This section analyses in deeper details the interaction between formal and informal care 
regarding the disability level of the elderly. In order to do so, we introduce in the empirical 
model the product of informal care and the disability level of the elderly. The model now has 
one additional endogenous variable and thus requires additional instruments: these are 
naturally the product of the distance from the nearest child and the disability level of the 
elderly and the product of the number of sons and daughters, and the disability level. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the paid domestic use model including the interaction term 
between informal care and the disability level of the elderly. The exogeneity hypothesis of the 
Wald test is significantly rejected regarding the decision to use paid domestic help 
( 29 . 11
2
2 = χ ) and the instruments pass the over-identification tests ( 31 . 4
2
5 = χ ). Moreover, the 
hypothesis of exogeneity of informal care is also rejected for the intensity of paid domestic 
help (F(2, 609) = 3.09). As expected, the interaction term between informal care and the 
disability level is positive and significant suggesting that the substitution effect is lower for 
elderly suffering from high disability level. Regarding the intensity of paid domestic help, the 
coefficient on informal care is negative but not significant and the coefficient on the 
interaction term is negative and significant, confirming our results. The elasticity of paid 
domestic help with respect to informal care for the average individual is computed at three 
different values of the disability level index corresponding to individuals suffering from no 
limitation (disability level = 0.47), those being limited but not severely (disability level = 
1.19) and those being severely limited (disability level = 2.15). The elasticity estimates are – 
1.77, - 1.04 and - 0.27 respectively, the latter being not significant at the five-percent level 
(See Table 6). 
The results from the nursing care equation are not presented because the inclusion of the 
interaction term between informal care and the disability level has no significant effect and 
does not change the results from the previous section. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
 
6.1. The instruments 
 
Using geographical distance as an instrument for informal care might be criticised because 
this variable is likely not to be exogenous to the use of formal care. As discussed earlier, 
children may live closer to their parents when the latter are in worse health, moreover, 
children may choose to live nearer to their parents if the availability of formal care is scarce in 
the region where the parents live. As a check, we estimate the model after having dropped 
geographical distance from the model. Moreover, we add to our sample all individuals being 
65 year-old or over and having no children (1,291 individuals). The instruments for informal 
care are now the number of sons and the number of daughters of the respondents. Table 7 
presents the results of the extended two-part model of paid domestic help.
16 Results are 
                                                 
16 The results from the nursing care equation are not shown as the hypothesis of exogeneity of informal care is 
not rejected. The results from the simple two-part model from Table 4 still hold.   12
consistent with those obtained from the model using geographical distance as additional 
instrument. The coefficient on informal care is still negative and significant at the 10-percent 
level and the coefficient on the interaction term between informal care and the disability level 
is still positive but no more significant for the decision equation. Regarding the intensity of 
the use of paid domestic help, the coefficient on informal care is also negative and significant 
while the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. The estimated 
elasticity of paid domestic help use with respect to informal care is -1.37 for individuals with 
no limitations, -0.80 for respondents limited, but not severely, and -0.19 for those severely 
limited with their daily activities (See Table 8). As a result, this estimation shows that the use 
of geographical distance from the nearest children as an instrument for informal care does not 
affect the main results of this analysis. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
6.2. The disability level 
 
We now test some alternatives regarding the measurement of the disability level. We 
estimate the model using different variables related to the disability level of the elderly to 
analyse the effect of disability on the relationship between formal and informal care. This 
sensitivity analysis is only conducted for the use of paid domestic help as the effect of 
disability level is unimportant in the relationship between informal and nursing care. 
The first sensitivity analysis consists in estimating the model with no interaction term 
between informal care and the disability level on three types of individuals separately: 
individuals suffering from severe limitations in their daily activities, those being limited to 
some extend and those having no limitations.
17 These groups are computed from the 
categorical variable that asks to which extent, if any, the respondent is limited in his daily 
activities because of health-related problem. Results from this analysis are consistent with 
those obtained in the previous section.
18 The computed elasticity of paid domestic help with 
respect to informal care for the average individual of each category is equal to - 1.48 for 
individuals not limited in their daily activities, - 0.89 for those limited, but not severely, and - 
0.003 for those severely limited.
19  
 
6.3. The sample definition 
 
The sample selection of our main results is all individuals being at least 65 year-old and 
having between one and four children. It is worth noting that our results are robust to changes 
in the sample definition. Several sample selection have been tested. All single individuals 
being 65 year-old or more, all individuals being 70 year-old or over, and all individuals being 
at least 65 year-old and being limited in their daily activities (those limited, but not severely, 
and those severely limited). In all case, the signs of the coefficients remain the same as in our 





                                                 
17 Note that our constructed variable for the disability level is still included in this model to take into account the 
heterogeneity of the disability level within each category. 
18 Results are available upon request. 
19 The bootstrapped elasticities for individuals with no limitation or being limited, but not severely are 
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.   13
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the use of formal home care and informal care of the elderly in 
Europe. Using the most recent European data coming from the first wave of SHARE, we 
construct a two-part utilisation model estimating the effects of informal care supply from the 
children on the demand for paid domestic help and nursing care among their elderly parents in 
nine European countries. The model takes into account the potential endogenous relationship 
between formal and informal care by using children characteristics as instruments. Results 
indicate that informal care is endogenous to the decision to use domestic paid help while no 
endogeneity is detected regarding the nursing care equation. Moreover, we find that informal 
care is a substitute for paid domestic help. However, the substitution effect tends to disappear 
for elderly suffering from heavy disability. Finally, nursing care appears as being a weak 
complement to informal care whatever the disability level.  
These findings have a cost implication: based on our results, encouraging informal care 
will have only significant effects among elderly with low disability and for unskilled care. As 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between paid domestic help and nursing care use, and the 
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Note: These figures show the relationship between paid domestic help and nursing care use, and the informal 
care received by the adult children. The results is based on individuals being 65 year-old or over having at least 
one child and not living with any of their children. Informal care corresponds to the sum of the average number 
of hours of care given by each child per month. Data are weighted.   16 






















N  7,329  605 1,166  521 921 1,004  618 802 578 1,114 
            
Receive paid domestic help   8.7%  5.0%  14.7% 17.5% 10.3% 2.2%  2.6% 12.7%  6.2% 6.5% 
Receive nursing care   6.1% 4.0% 11.7%  5.6% 16.7% 1.9%  1.9%  3.7% 4.2% 1.7% 
              
Hours  of  informal  care  from  the  children    per  month  5.6 6.0 5.7 3.3 5.8 8.6 7.7 1.4 10.1  3.0 
              
Woman  53.5% 58.8% 54.2% 55.7% 58.1% 51.6% 53.1% 48.5% 54.8% 50.2% 
Age  73.3 73.1 73.3 74.3 74.0 72.3 72.7 73.1 73.8 73.7 
Single  household  27.7% 42.5% 29.2% 39.7% 34.1% 21.6% 20.9% 21.8% 18.0% 25.9% 
Years  of  education  9.4 10.9  9.4 11.7  7.5 13.2  5.8 10.5  4.2 9.5 
Home-owner  69.4% 54.2% 78.6% 69.1% 76.1% 55.6% 80.3% 45.4% 92.4% 74.1% 
              
Limited in activities because of a health problem:              
Severely  limited  17.2% 15.9% 18.2% 15.2% 20.4% 21.6% 16.0% 19.6% 6.4%  15.4% 
Limited,  but  not  severely  33.9% 40.3% 28.9% 37.6% 27.8% 41.0% 35.0% 26.3% 42.6% 32.6% 
Not limited  49.0%  43.8%  52.9% 47.2% 51.8% 37.4% 49.0% 54.1% 51.0% 52.0% 
            
Yearly  household  gross  income  (median)  40,816 36,612 41,715 40,614 47,429 40,157 27,332 52,937 18,231 47,855 
Net  worth  (median)  342,175 176,239 412,665 399,135 447,532 351,774 336,401 348,514 288,654 262,531 
              
Number  of  sons  1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Number of daughters  1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Total  number  of  children  2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.3 
            
Distance  from  the  nearest  child  (in  kilometres)  42.9 39.9 21.7 48.1 71.3 51.0 27.9 25.8 32.4 59.7   17
Table 2. Determinants of informal care provided by the children in Europe. 
Dependent variable: log (1+hi)  
Intercept  -1.929*** 
  (0.167) 
Woman   0.064** 
  (0.026) 
Age   0.028*** 
  (0.002) 
Years of education  -0.015*** 
  (0.004) 
Single household   0.325*** 
  (0.033) 
Home-owner   0.106*** 
  (0.036) 
Net worth quartile:  
1
st     - 
   
2
nd  -0.052 
  (0.038) 
3
rd  -0.099** 
  (0.044) 
4
th  -0.079* 
  (0.046) 
Income quartile:   
1
st     - 
   
2
nd   0.039 
  (0.033) 
3
rd   0.034 
  (0.038) 
4
th   0.090** 
  (0.040) 
Disability level   0.126*** 
  (0.035) 
(Disability level) ²   0.034*** 
  (0.010) 
Country dummies   yes 
Instrumental variables   
Number of sons   0.011 
  (0.015) 
Number of daughters   0.050*** 
  (0.016) 
Distance to the nearest child (in kilometres)  -0.002*** 
  (0.000) 
(Distance to the nearest child) ²   0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
R²   0.157 
N   7,329 
Note: *, **, *** means that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1 %-
level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   18
Table 3. Two-part model of paid domestic help use. 
Dependent variable: g1  Probit model  IV Probit model  OLS  IV OLS 
Intercept  -7.227*** -8.510***   0.563    0.708 
  (0.355) (0.540) (0.582)  (0.630) 
Log (h+1)   0.059***  -0.621***   0.122***   0.181* 
  (0.019) (0.205) (0.027)  (0.109) 
Woman   0.258***   0.298***  -0.099  -0.104 
  (0.058) (0.062) (0.094)  (0.093) 
Age   0.058***   0.077***   0.011*   0.009 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.007) 
Years of education   0.008  -0.004   0.026**   0.027** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Single household   0.502***   0.717***   0.059   0.055 
  (0.065) (0.095) (0.101)  (0.100) 
Home-owner  -0.046   0.021   0.047   0.021 
  (0.076) (0.083) (0.118)  (0.125) 
Wealth quartile:       
1
st     -     -     -     - 
       
2
nd   0.000  -0.035  -0.015   0.005 
  (0.080) (0.085) (0.125)  (0.128) 
3
rd  -0.075 -0.152 -0.126  -0.119 
  (0.094) (0.102) (0.150)  (0.149) 
4
th   0.010  -0.049  -0.289*  -0.282* 
  (0.102) (0.108) (0.170)  (0.168) 
Income quartile:       
1
st     -     -     -     - 
       
2
nd   0.110   0.132*   0.069   0.079 
  (0.070) (0.074) (0.107)  (0.107) 
3
rd   0.018   0.034   0.378**   0.382*** 
  (0.088) (0.092) (0.145)  (0.143) 
4
th   0.182**   0.230**   0.299**   0.323** 
  (0.087) (0.093) (0.139)  (0.144) 
Disability level   0.635***   0.729***  -0.031  -0.058 
  (0.074) (0.083) (0.119)  (0.127) 
(Disability level) ²  -0.048***  -0.026   0.056**   0.059** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.026)  (0.026) 
Country dummies   yes   yes   yes   yes 
(pseudo-) R²  0.337    0.207  0.229 
N 7,329  7,329  635  635 
Note: *, **, *** means that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1 %-
level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   19
Table 4. Two-part model of nursing care use. 
Dependent variable: g2  Probit model  IV Probit model  OLS  IV OLS 
Intercept  -4.245*** -4.058***   0.001  -0.226 
  (0.380) (0.556) (0.696)  (0.782) 
Log (h+1)   0.078***   0.175   0.051  -0.044 
  (0.021) (0.220) (0.035)  (0.161) 
Woman   0.034   0.027  -0.025  -0.020 
  (0.062) (0.063) (0.117)  (0.115) 
Age   0.017***   0.015*   0.005   0.008 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) 
Years of education   0.002   0.003   0.008   0.007 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Single household   0.122*   0.091   0.158   0.236 
  (0.073) (0.101) (0.141)  (0.189) 
Home-owner  -0.032 -0.040 -0.094  -0.066 
  (0.084) (0.086) (0.154)  (0.158) 
Wealth quartile:       
1
st     -     -     -     - 
       
2
nd  -0.075 -0.071 -0.098  -0.079 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.158)  (0.159) 
3
rd  -0.054 -0.045   0.250    0.290 
  (0.100) (0.102) (0.177)  (0.187) 
4
th   0.000   0.006   0.055   0.065 
  (0.106) (0.107) (0.194)  (0.192) 
Income quartile:       
1
st     -     -     -     - 
       
2
nd  -0.042 -0.045 -0.016  -0.025 
  (0.075) (0.076) (0.140)  (0.138) 
3
rd  -0.033 -0.034   0.026    0.016 
  (0.089) (0.090) (0.163)  (0.161) 
4
th  -0.003 -0.009   0.095    0.067 
  (0.091) (0.092) (0.168)  (0.171) 
Disability level   0.426***   0.413***   0.425***   0.483*** 
  (0.078) (0.083) (0.148)  (0.174) 
(Disability level) ²   0.012   0.008  -0.026  -0.034 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.032)  (0.034) 
Country  dummies  yes yes yes  yes 
(pseudo-) R²  0.273    0.318  0.341 
N 7,329  7,329  448  448 
Note: *, **, *** means that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1 %-
level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   20
Table 5. Two-part model of paid domestic help use (extended). 
Dependent variable: g1  Probit model  IV Probit model OLS  IV OLS 
Intercept  -7.278***  -8.390***   0.641   1.424** 
 (0.356)  (0.526)  (0.586)  (0.704) 
Log (h+1)   0.134***  -1.323**   0.062  -0.401 
 (0.037)  (0.519)  (0.060)  (0.337) 
(Disability level)*Log (h+1)  -0.038**   0.413**   0.026   0.252** 
 (0.016)  (0.196)  (0.024)  (0.121) 
Woman   0.263***   0.286***  -0.104  -0.149 
 (0.059)  (0.064)  (0.094)  (0.101) 
Age   0.058***   0.077***   0.011*   0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Years of education   0.009  -0.009   0.026**   0.027** 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Single household   0.497***   0.748***   0.064   0.104 
 (0.066)  (0.108)  (0.101)  (0.110) 
Home-owner  -0.044   0.016   0.056   0.112 
 (0.076)  (0.085)  (0.118)  (0.145) 
Wealth quartile:        
1
st     -     -     -     - 
        
2
nd -0.002  -0.033  -0.022  -0.066 
 (0.080)  (0.088)  (0.125)  (0.144) 
3
rd -0.076  -0.154  -0.132  -0.171 
 (0.094)  (0.105)  (0.150)  (0.162) 
4
th   0.004  -0.044  -0.287*  -0.269 
 (0.102)  (0.111)  (0.170)  (0.180) 
Income quartile:        
1
st     -     -     -     - 
        
2
nd   0.110   0.140*   0.073   0.114 
 (0.070)  (0.077)  (0.107)  (0.114) 
3
rd   0.019   0.042   0.370**   0.312** 
 (0.088)  (0.095)  (0.145)  (0.157) 
4
th   0.178**   0.261***   0.300**   0.332** 
 (0.087)  (0.099)  (0.139)  (0.153) 
Disability level   0.630***   0.855***  -0.039  -0.128 
 (0.074)  (0.117)  (0.119)  (0.135) 
(Disability level) ²  -0.038**  -0.149***   0.052**   0.018 
 (0.018)  (0.057)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
Country dummies   yes   yes   yes   yes 
(pseudo-) R²  0338    0.207  0.121 
N   7,329   7,329   635   635 
Note: *, **, *** means that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1 %-
level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   21
Table 6. Elasticity of formal care with respect to informal care  





Paid domestic help  Benchmark model    -0.70*  [-1.08;-0.32]  
  Extended model  Average   -1.22*  [-1.83;-0.62] 
  No  limitation  -1.77*  [-2.65;-0.89] 
    Not severely limited  -1.04*  [-1.55;-0.54] 
  Severely  limited  -0.27  [-0.56;  0.02] 
Nursing care  Benchmark model     0.2  [ 0.09; 0.30] 
Note: The 95% confidence intervals are bootstrapped. 
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 5%-level.   22
Table 7. Two-part model of paid domestic help use (extended). 
Dependent variable: g1  Probit model  IV Probit model OLS  IV OLS 
Intercept  -6.835***  -7.318***   0.667   0.986* 
 (0.307)  (0.377)  (0.499)  (0.541) 
Log (h+1)   0.118***  -0.748*   0.035  -0.438* 
 (0.036)  (0.429)  (0.058)  (0.230) 
(Disability level)*Log (h+1)  -0.035**   0.247   0.035   0.234*** 
 (0.016)  (0.169)  (0.023)  (0.084) 
Woman   0.241***   0.259***  -0.111  -0.135 
 (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.084)  (0.087) 
Age   0.053***   0.062***   0.009*   0.007 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Years of education   0.010   0.000   0.020*   0.022* 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Single household   0.548***   0.642***   0.159*   0.190** 
 (0.058)  (0.073)  (0.091)  (0.095) 
Home-owner  -0.016   0.007   0.089   0.154 
 (0.068)  (0.071)  (0.105)  (0.115) 
Wealth quartile:        
1
st     -     -     -     - 
        
2
nd -0.037  -0.046  -0.004  -0.053 
 (0.070)  (0.073)  (0.111)  (0.118) 
3
rd -0.097  -0.127  -0.142  -0.170 
 (0.083)  (0.086)  (0.132)  (0.137) 
4
th -0.075  -0.084  -0.102  -0.061 
 (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.152)  (0.158) 
Income quartile:        
1
st     -     -     -     - 
        
2
nd   0.090   0.110*   0.126   0.148 
 (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.097)  (0.101) 
3
rd   0.085   0.095   0.424***   0.385*** 
 (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.127)  (0.132) 
4
th   0.203**   0.245***   0.206   0.196 
 (0.078)  (0.083)  (0.128)  (0.134) 
Disability level   0.655***   0.771***   0.010  -0.039 
 (0.067)  (0.091)  (0.106)  (0.115) 
(Disability level) ²  -0.046***  -0.105**   0.037   0.015 
 (0.017)  (0.042)  (0.023)  (0.026) 
Country dummies    yes   yes  yes  yes 
(pseudo-) R²  0.326    0.189  0.134 
N 8,620  8,620  804  804 
Note: *, **, *** means that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1 %-
level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   23
Table 8. Elasticity of formal care with respect to informal care. 
Instruments: number of sons and daughters. 





Paid domestic help  Extended model  Average   -0.94*  [-1.58;-0.30] 
  No  limitation  -1.37*  [-2.38;-0.36] 
    Not severely limited  -0.80*  [-1.32;-0.28] 
  Severely  limited  -0.19  [-0.47;  0.08] 
Note: The 95% confidence intervals are bootstrapped. 
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 5%-level.   24
Appendix 1: The computation of the elasticity of formal care with respect to 
informal care. 
 
The elasticity of formal care with respect to informal care from the two-part model can 






Where  jh ε is the elasticity of formal care j with respect to informal care (h),  h  is the 
sample average of the number of hours of informal care received by month,  X  is the 
vector of the sample average of all explanatory variables, j γˆ is the vector of the 
coefficients estimates and  hj γˆ is the coefficient related to  ) 1 ln( i h +  in the part one 
equation. The instrumental variable probit model used in the part one of the two-part 
model only estimates the coefficients up to scale. As a result, we have to adjust these 
scaled coefficients to get the parameters of interest of the part one equation, j γˆ . When 
we have one endogenous variable in the structural model, Wooldridge (2002, p.474) 
shows that the scaled parameters have to be divided by the factor
2 / 1 2 2 ) 1 ˆ ˆ ( + τ θ j , where 
j θ ˆ is the scaled coefficient related to the first stage equation residuals in the second 
stage equation of the IV probit model, and 
2 ˆ τ is the estimated variance of these 
residuals. 
The elasticity of formal care j with respect to informal care from the extended two-part 
model allowing for heterogeneous effect of informal care with respect to the disability 






Once again, the instrumental variable probit model gives the coefficients of the part one 
equation up to scale and have to be adjusted in order to compute the elasticities. In this 
case, the model has now two endogenous variables and the second stage equation 
includes the residuals of the two first stage equations (one for each endogenous 
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2 ˆ
kj θ  corresponds to the estimated coefficient 
of the residuals from the first stage equation of the endogenous variable k in the second 
stage equation,
2 ˆk τ  is the estimated variance of the residuals form the first stage equation 
of the endogenous variable k and  12 ˆ σ is the estimated covariance of the two residuals. 
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Appendix 2: The construction of the disability level 
 
Activities of Daily Living (ADL): 
 
These variables are related to basic tasks of everyday life. The respondent is asked 
about his ability to perform the following ADL: 
 
-  Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks 
-  Walking across a room 
-  Bathing or showering  
-  Eating, such as cutting up your food  
-  Getting in or out of bed 
-  Using the toilet, including getting up or down 
 
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living scale (IADL): 
 
These variables are activities of daily living that are related to the ability of the 
individual to live independently. The respondent is asked about his ability to perform 
the following IADL: 
  
- Using a map to figure out how to get around in a strange place 
- Preparing a hot meal 
- Shopping for groceries 
- Making telephone calls 
- Taking medications 
- Doing work around the house or garden 




It corresponds to the number of limitations with mobility, arm function and fine motor 
function reported by each individual. These are: 
 
- Walking 100 metres 
- Sitting for about two hours 
- Getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods 
- Climbing several flights of stairs without resting 
- Climbing one flight of stairs without resting 
- Stooping, kneeling, or crouching 
- Reaching or extending your arms above shoulder level 
- Pulling or pushing large objects like a living room chair 
- Lifting or carrying weights over 10 pounds/5 kilos, like a heavy 
   bag of groceries 
- Picking up a small coin from a table 
   26
Chronic diseases: 
 
It refers to a list of conditions of the respondent diagnosed by a doctor: 
 
- A heart attack including myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis or any other 
heart  
   problem including congestive heart failure 
- High blood pressure or hypertension 
- High blood cholesterol 
- A stroke or cerebral vascular disease 
- Diabetes or high blood sugar 
- Chronic lung disease such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema 
- Asthma 
- Arthritis, including osteoarthritis, or rheumatism 
- Osteoporosis 
- Cancer or malignant tumour, including leukaemia or lympho ma, but excluding minor 
skin 
   cancers 
- Stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer 
- Parkinson disease 
- Cataracts 
- Hip fracture or femoral fracture 
- Other conditions, not yet mentioned 
Symptoms: 
It corresponds to the following symptoms reported by the respondent: 
 
- Pain in your back, knees, hips or any other joint 
- Heart trouble or angina, chest pain during exercise 
- Breathlessness, difficulty breathing 
- Persistent cough 
- Swollen legs 
- Sleeping problems 
- Falling down 
- Fear of falling down 
- Dizziness, faints or blackouts 
- Stomach or intestine problems, including constipation, air, diarrhoea 
- Incontinence or involuntary loss of urine 
- Other symptoms, not yet mentioned 
   27
Table A1. Ordered probit model of limitation with daily activities 
  Coefficient  (Std error) 
Chronic diseases:     
Heart attack   0.301***  (0.041) 
High blood pressure   0.029  (0.031) 
High blood cholesterol  -0.085**  (0.036) 
Stroke or cerebral vascular disease   0.430***  (0.067) 
Diabetes   0.164***  (0.045) 
Chronic lung disease   0.214***  (0.061) 
Asthma   0.204***  (0.066) 
Arthritis   0.159***  (0.036) 
Osteoporosis   0.069  (0.050) 
Cancer   0.342***  (0.052) 
Stomach or duodenal ulcer   0.226***  (0.059) 
Parkinson disease   0.688***  (0.158) 
Cataracts -0.073*  (0.043) 
Hip fracture   0.271***  (0.086) 
Other conditions   0.429***  (0.038) 
Symptoms:     
Pain in the back. knees. hips or any other joint   0.249***  (0.033) 
Heart trouble or angina   0.312***  (0.053) 
Breathlessness   0.172***  (0.046) 
Persistent cough   0.071  (0.064) 
Swollen legs   0.057  (0.043) 
Sleeping problems   0.029  (0.038) 
Falling down   0.091  (0.067) 
Fear of falling down   0.099**  (0.048) 
Dizziness. faints or blackouts   0.150***  (0.047) 
Stomach or intestine problems   0.053  (0.043) 
Incontinence -0.051  (0.054) 
Other symptoms   0.295***  (0.070) 
Mobility limitations:     
Walking 100 meters   0.434***  (0.051) 
Sitting for about two hours   0.097**  (0.049) 
Getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods   0.112***  (0.040) 
Climbing several flights of stairs without resting   0.309***  (0.037) 
Climbing one flight of stair without resting   0.074  (0.050) 
Stooping. kneeling. or crouching   0.192***  (0.036) 
Reaching or extending your arms above shoulder level   0.162***  (0.054) 
Pulling or pushing large objects like a living room chair   0.143***  (0.047) 
Lifting or carrying weights over 10 pounds/5 kilos. like a heavy bag of groceries   0.161***  (0.041) 
Picking up a small coin from a table   0.013  (0.076) 
ADL:     
Dressing. including putting on shoes and socks   0.150**  (0.064) 
Walking across a room   0.256*  (0.133) 
Bathing or showering   0.143*  (0.075) 
Eating. such as cutting up your food  -0.120  (0.130) 
Getting in or out of bed  -0.041  (0.107) 
Using the toilet. including up or down  -0.261*  (0.134) 
IADL:       28
Using a map to figure out how to get around in a strange place  -0.206***  (0.054) 
Preparing a hot meal   0.065  (0.096) 
Shopping for groceries   0.202***  (0.076) 
Making telephone calls   0.214*  (0.120) 
Taking medications   0.170  (0.136) 
Doing work around the house or garden   0.533***  (0.054) 
Managing money. such as paying bills and keeping track of expenses   0.122  (0.086) 
Pseudo-R
2  0.240     29
Appendix 3: Coefficient estimates of the country dummies 
 
Table 2 (continued): Determinants of informal care received by the parents in 
Europe.  
Country dummies 
Dependent variable: ln (hi + 1)   
Sweden       - 
   
Denmark   0.083 
  (0.055) 
The Netherlands  -0.066 
  (0.049) 
Germany   0.443*** 
  (0.047) 
Belgium   0.027 
  (0.043) 
France   0.023 
  (0.046) 
Austria   0.212*** 
  (0.053) 
Italy  -0.019 
  (0.053) 
Spain  -0.026 
  (0.056) 
 
Table 3 (continued): Two-part model of paid domestic help use. 
Country dummies 
Dependent variable: g1  Probit model  IV Probit model   OLS  IV OLS 
Sweden        -        -        -        - 
      
Denmark   0.720***   0.804***  -0.607***  -0.603*** 
  (0.108) (0.118) (0.163) (0.161) 
The Netherlands   0.724***   0.723***   0.206   0.222 
  (0.103) (0.109) (0.164) (0.164) 
Germany -0.664***  -0.340**  -0.060  -0.126 
  (0.140) (0.174) (0.257) (0.279) 
Belgium   0.632***   0.697***   0.428***   0.424*** 
  (0.093) (0.100) (0.149) (0.147) 
France   0.236**   0.254**   0.486***   0.477*** 
  (0.103) (0.109) (0.164) (0.162) 
Austria  -0.225*  -0.050   0.036   0.021 
  (0.131) (0.146) (0.229) (0.227) 
Italy  -0.415***  -0.386**   0.854***   0.905*** 
  (0.154) (0.158) (0.298) (0.307) 
Spain   0.054   0.050   0.418*   0.421* 
  (0.131) (0.138) (0.225) (0.222)   30
Table 4 (continued): Two-part model of nursing care use. 
Country dummies 
Dependent variable: g2  Probit model  IV Probit model   OLS  IV OLS 
Sweden        -        -        -        - 
      
Denmark   0.611***   0.599***  -0.077  -0.083 
  (0.153) (0.155) (0.313) (0.307) 
The Netherlands   0.573***   0.573***   0.672**   0.576 
  (0.147) (0.148) (0.317) (0.351) 
Germany  -0.045 -0.090   0.565   0.627* 
  (0.165) (0.194) (0.358) (0.367) 
Belgium   1.100***   1.090***   0.052  -0.007 
  (0.125) (0.127) (0.267) (0.280) 
France   1.367***   1.363***  -0.401  -0.481 
  (0.126) (0.127) (0.266) (0.293) 
Austria   0.433***   0.410**   1.453***   1.434*** 
  (0.157) (0.165) (0.328) (0.323) 
Italy  -0.003 -0.006 -0.236 -0.276 
  (0.183) (0.184) (0.396) (0.395) 
Spain   0.426***   0.425***  -0.643*  -0.648* 
  (0.162) (0.162) (0.342) (0.337) 
 
Table 5 (continued): Two-part model of paid domestic help use (extended). 
Country dummies 
Dependent variable: g1  Probit model  IV Probit model   OLS  IV OLS 
Sweden        -        -        -        - 
      
Denmark   0.717***   0.849***  -0.599***  -0.525*** 
  (0.108) (0.127) (0.163) (0.175) 
The Netherlands   0.725***   0.733***   0.213   0.280 
  (0.103) (0.113) (0.164) (0.176) 
Germany  -0.668***  -0.233 -0.059 -0.095 
  (0.140) (0.203) (0.257) (0.300) 
Belgium   0.628***   0.714***   0.437***   0.506*** 
  (0.093) (0.105) (0.149) (0.162) 
France   0.235**   0.251**   0.489***   0.511*** 
  (0.103) (0.112) (0.164) (0.175) 
Austria  -0.233*  -0.015   0.040   0.071 
  (0.131) (0.156) (0.229) (0.245) 
Italy  -0.423***  -0.384**   0.879***   1.132*** 
  (0.154) (0.162) (0.298) (0.333) 
Spain   0.058   0.041   0.415*   0.391 
  (0.131) (0.142) (0.225) (0.238) 
 
 
 